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Based in London, the Legatum Institute (LI) is an independent non-
partisan public policy organisation whose research, publications, and 
programmes advance ideas and policies in support of free and prosperous 
societies around the world.
LI’s signature annual publication is the Legatum Prosperity Index™, a 
unique global assessment of national prosperity based on both wealth 
and wellbeing. LI is the co-publisher of Democracy Lab, a journalistic 
joint-venture with Foreign Policy Magazine dedicated to covering political 
and economic transitions around the world.
PROSPERITY IN DEPTH
To complement the Prosperity Index, we commissioned 12 specialists —
economists, political scientists, journalists—to provide additional 
analysis of selected countries. Their studies vary from essays putting 
contemporary challenges into historical context (Iran, China, Mongolia) 
to up-to-the-minute surveys of the barriers to economic growth (Egypt, 
Japan, India) to controversial alternatives to the conventional policy 
interpretations (Iceland, Colombia, Vietnam). In each case they represent 
highly original work by distinguished experts that adds depth and insight 




Iran haunts our nightmares these days because its anti-Western government covets nuclear weapons. 
But Iran and its economy are worth understanding in some detail for a host of other reasons. 
The country is both blessed and cursed by oil wealth that makes it easy to sustain a decent 
living standard, but difficult to build a balanced industrial economy. It is an Islamic theocracy, 
and thus a natural experiment in whether Islamic fundamentalism is compatible with economic 
development. And it is an authoritarian state that can be seen as both as a model for the 
Islamists who have been empowered by the Arab Spring and a cautionary example of the 
consequences of turning back in the clock in a rapidly changing global economy. 
Iran is troubled society, to say the least—a reality that explains its 102nd ranking out of 142 
countries (down by 5 places since 2011) on the Legatum Institute Prosperity Index in spite of its 
relative prosperity. Indeed, while it ranks in the middle (70th) of the globe by purely economic 
criteria, it is near the bottom on sub-indices for Social Capital (121st), Personal Freedom 
(125th) and Safety & Security (125th).
Robert Looney is exceptionally well qualified to analyse Iran’s quest to build an economy on its 
own terms. He’s a University of California-trained economist who has written extensively on the 
Middle East and South Asia. But he is also a professor in the Department of National Security 
Affairs at the US Government’s Naval Postgraduate School in California. His primary focus, 
though, is that of a development specialist who links Iran’s current woes to its elites’ financial 
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To understand where the Iranian economy is going, it’s important to remember where it’s been. Like so many other oil-rich countries 
lacking the legal and political institutions of a modern market-based 
economy, pre-revolutionary Iran suffered from what has been dubbed 
the resource curse—a dependence on natural wealth that inhibited 
balanced economic development and sustained a culture of corruption. 
Indeed, discontent fed by the resource curse was an important factor 
leading to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. After the consolidation 
of power as an Islamic republic under the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
government proposed to run the economy on a model aimed at 
avoiding that trap.
That model, which shifted priorities from economic growth powered 
by oil wealth to social and economic justice, has worked better in its 
own terms than many would like to admit. Income per person has 
increased by half (in terms of purchasing power) since 1980, and a lot 
more of it ends up in the pockets of the poor. Health, as measured by 
factors such as infant mortality and life expectancy, has improved 
considerably. Average years of education have increased dramatically for 
women as well as men. But the formula has hardly proved a panacea. 
Iran has struggled almost continuously with high inflation, 
unemployment (especially youth unemployment) and a brain drain 
that has created a diaspora of well-educated emigrants. In the 
last 15 years, most of the growth (and job creation) has taken 
place in urban areas, leading to massive internal migration from 
the countryside. A raft of subsidies and price controls has badly 
distorted market prices—a problem that stubbornly resists solution. 
Meanwhile, economic sanctions have made it difficult to import 
critical industrial parts as well as depressing the exchange rate—
further adding to inflationary pressures.
Looking ahead, that raises a host of questions. Can Iran make 
the changes needed for the rapid growth required to manage 
unemployment? More generally, is ongoing authoritarian rule, 
complicated by the strictures of fundamentalist Islam and an 
aggressive foreign policy, compatible with further development?
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In the early 1960s, Iran’s living standard was roughly equivalent to that of Malaysia, 
South Korea and Turkey. And the monarchy’s fanatical drive for regional power, built 
around rising oil revenues and alliance with the west in the Cold War, gave it quite 
a bump. Between 1965 and 1979 the economy grew at an average real rate of 7.4%, 
among the fastest rates in the world. 
The aggregate figures, however, concealed a host of weaknesses. Per capita GDP 
expanded at an average annual rate of 4.4%—again a comparatively high rate, but one 
that reflected Iran’s population explosion and the looming necessity of creating a lot of 
jobs for its exceptionally young population. Moreover, much of the increase in national 
income came from increases in the production of oil—and after the Arab oil embargo 
of 1973, from increases in the price of oil. 
Then, too, there was the issue of legitimacy for a monarch installed by former colonial 
powers and not given to hand wringing over inequality. While there’s not much hard 




oil-based boom certainly increased the perception of injustice. The 
Shah and his cronies flaunted great wealth, and the division in living 
standards between rural and urban areas almost certainly widened.
AFTER THE FALL 
In part, Iran’s post-revolutionary economic struggles can be 
traced to the attitude of the Islamic Republic’s founding father, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini believed economic growth 
was an unworthy pursuit, a sentiment that was incorporated 
into the 1979 Constitution, which notes that the economy is 
“not an end in itself, but a means intended only to contribute 
to the attainment of the ultimate goal,” namely “a movement 
toward God.” When asked what he was doing about rising rates 
of inflation in the new Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ayatollah 
replied, “This revolution is not about the price of watermelons.” 
From this starting point, the Islamic republic’s economy has gone 
through several phases. The one constant affecting policymaking 
during all these phases has been the tension between the two 
main factions within the regime: the conservative ‘Islamists’ and 
the more pragmatic ‘modernists.’ 
EARLY POST-REVOLUTION AND THE WAR YEARS
Initially, the conservative leaders of the Islamic Republic sought 
to create new economic structures compatible with both 
revolutionary ideology and Islamic precepts of social justice. 
The country’s new constitution committed the government to 
eradicating poverty, banning usury and ‘extravagance,’ aiming 
at self-sufficiency in food production, and preventing foreign 
economic domination—especially in the oil industry.
Economic policy had a decidedly anti-market, anti-capitalist 
and anti-globalist slant. The country’s major industries, 
private banks and insurance companies were all nationalized. 
Thousands of businesses belonging to the Shah’s associates and 
supporters were confiscated, and turned over to Islamic charitable 
foundations—the Persian term is bonyads—providing safety-net 
services that are generally the province of government in the West. 
While bonyads pre-dated the revolution, their real power was built 
on newly confiscated wealth—and the patronage that came with 
dispensing it. 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also took on 
added importance. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini tasked the IRGC 
with the defence of the new regime. During the titanic 1980–88 
war with Iraq, however, the Guard also took on the job of 
providing welfare and small loans to veterans and their families. 
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Wholesale nationalization, together with the exodus of middle-
class Iranians, the decline in international oil prices and the 
destruction caused by the war of attrition with Iraq, had 
devastating economic consequences. Between 1980 and 1988, 
per capita GDP and capital formation each declined by one-third. 
Inflation accelerated to nearly 20%.
Compounding these problems, the Islamic government encouraged 
rapid population growth (which had hardly been slow under the 
Shah); accordingly, the country’s population expanded at an 
almost unprecedented average annual rate of 3.8% between 1980 
and 1988. While the government later had second thoughts about 
procreation to the max and did succeed in curbing births, the 
demographic momentum built up in the early 1980s was difficult 
to overcome. The country’s population nearly doubled between 
1979 and 2001, putting enormous demands on Iran’s education 
system and shovelling millions of young, relatively unskilled 
Iranians into the workforce. 
RAFSANJANI AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ELITE 
Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the 
authoritarian (but also pragmatic) Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
became Iran’s president and began an economic liberalization 
phase. His first priority was to rebuild after the devastating war 
with Iraq. To his credit, Rafsanjani understood that the economy’s 
problems stemmed not just from the ravages of war; their roots 
lay in the excesses of the immediate post-revolutionary years 
that were reflected in overbearing regulation, a narrow tax 
base, scattershot subsidies, an overvalued currency reflecting 
dependence on oil, and a dysfunctional banking system. 
Rafsanjani’s initiatives to address these impediments to growth 
were embodied in a structural adjustment programme—the so-
called Rafsanjani perestroika. One of its key elements was the 
proposed privatisation of many of the increasingly inefficient 
state enterprises. This proposal met with vigorous opposition 
from state employees and other beneficiaries, and led to heated 
clashes between liberal and conservative factions. The initiative 
was stillborn.
Unable to make significant gains in through privatisation, 
Rafsanjani tried a different tack, stimulating competition 
between state entities—especially in the areas of construction 
and restoration of facilities damaged in the war. The IRGC was 
a key participant, transforming itself into a conglomerate that 
opened enterprises and bid on government contracts. The IRGC’s 
financial activities also expanded during postwar reconstruction, 
as it extended its wartime micro-lending operations into 
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money laundering and the creation of vast smuggling networks. In a pattern presaged 
in revolutionary China, it would eventually build an industrial arm that serves as 
patronage and income supplement to IRGC leaders—and as a potent opponent of 
inclusive reform.
Once he died, Ayatollah Khomeini’s edict that social justice should be the primary goal 
of the revolution faded in importance. In its place burgeoned a crony capitalist system 
reminiscent of the Shah’s time—though with a distinctly Islamic flavour. Corruption 
rose as the bonyads and the Guards, along with the traditional military, the Rafsanjani 
family and their clients, were freed to do business without the discipline of either even-
handed regulation or a competitive marketplace. At one point, Rafsanjani was reputed 
to be Iran’s wealthiest individual. Insider mullahs also benefited through interest-free 
loans from the state banks and access to foreign exchange at official rates that could 
be resold at a market rate that was five times higher. 
Though designated as religious charities serving the poor, the bonyads became some of 
Iran’s wealthiest entities. With executives appointed by the Supreme Leader, they own 
much of Iran’s industry as well as vast tracts of real estate. While there is little financial 





















data on these organizations, the indirect evidence suggests the bonyads control about 
20% of Iran’s GDP. The bonyads are exempt from taxation, and their capacity to dole out 
patronage has become a key element in the regime’s ability to maintain political control.
Thus rather than opening the economy by freeing enterprise from the strictures of 
government ownership and/or regulation, Rafsanjani ended up strengthening only the 
IRGC, the bonyads—and, of course, the insiders who ran them. Companies associated with 
the bonyads and the IRGC won a disproportionate share of government reconstruction 
contracts and used their preferential access to licenses, foreign exchange and bank credit 
to become leading traders. Well-connected conservative merchants (bazaaris) with 
established trading networks also used some of their accrued wealth to enter industry, 
which had been the preserve of the state since the revolution.
The protection from competition granted to the bonyads and IRGC took a toll on 
productivity that was reflected in lagging economic growth. The economy recovered 
somewhat during the post-war period, with per capita GDP growing by 26% between 
1989 and 1996. However, that gain only brought per capita income back to the level at 
the time of the revolution. Ominously, high inflation became chronic, averaging 25% 
across the period.
NASIR AL-MULK MOSQUE, SHIRAZ
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KHATAMI TO THE RESCUE? 
In 1997, the ascension of Mohammed Khatami, an Islamic scholar 
who was a veteran of the revolution, to the presidency ushered 
in a social reform phase that was vigorously opposed by the 
conservatives. Although Khatami did not directly threaten the 
legitimacy of rule by clerics, he did encourage political dialogue 
and edged Iran toward détente with the West.
On matters economic, he sought a normalization of trade and 
investment with the outside world, and talked about re-privatising 
industry that had been confiscated in the wake of the Shah’s 
departure. However, there is little evidence that he had the will 
to challenge the economic interests of what might be called 
Iran’s military-theocratic complex. Nor, for that matter, did he 
have a way: world oil prices fell sharply on his watch, leaving 
his administration with little surplus with which to win friends or 
buy allegiance to market reforms. 
Declining oil revenues after the Asian financial meltdown 
(and subsequent fiscal retrenchment) in 1997 did put pressure 
on Khatami to attack the country’s vast array of household 
subsidies. These subsidies, a legacy of the Iran Iraq War, had 
been left in place both to mask the regime’s economic failures 
and insure the support of the poor. But the political dam held; 
subsidy reform was postponed for a decade during which their 
cost grew to nearly one-fifth of the GDP. 
During Khatami’s second term (beginning in 2001), rising oil 
revenues made it possible to pursue some adjustment policies—in 
particular a move to ease controls on capital movements and to 
adopt a floating exchange rate that offered hope for a gain in non-
oil exports. Inflation eased to around 15%, and investment grew 
by about 8% annually, faster than any time since the revolution. 
Nonetheless, Iran never came close to creating enough jobs to 
accommodate the hordes leaving school. Even before the full 
effect of a 1980s baby boom began to be felt in labour markets, 
unemployment rose to the double digits. Between 1996 and 
2000, some 700,000 workers entered the labour market, while 
only 300,000 jobs were created. By 2000, unemployment was 
estimated at between 15 and 25%, with much higher rates 
among urban youth. According to the World Bank, to create 
the 700,000 to 800,000 new jobs each year needed to reduce 
unemployment to acceptable levels and keep it there would have 
required 6% growth. Post-revolution Iran has not come close.
Explanations abound for Iran’s mediocre economic performance. 
While the 1980s war with Iraq, international sanctions and 
volatile oil prices have all played a part, the more fundamental 
Between 1996 and 
2000, some 700,000 
workers entered the 
labour market, while 
only 300,000 jobs 
were created. By 2000, 
unemployment was 
estimated at between 
15 and 25%, with 
much higher rates 
among urban youth.
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cause was a structural trap in which the power of incumbent 
interests stymie the reallocation of capital from inefficient firms 
to more productive ones. 
In the case of Japan (where the term was first applied) the 
government couldn’t bring itself to withdraw support from 
failing businesses and the banks that propped them up during 
that economy’s ‘lost decade’. In the case of Iran, the mullahs, 
elements of the armed forces and those who enjoyed their 
patronage exercised veto power over reforms that would have 
privatised state-owned enterprises, rationalized the businesses 
controlled by the bonyads, and replaced consumer subsidies with 
less-distorting transfers to the poor. The result was (and still 
is) chronic economic underperformance, even during periods in 
which oil revenues are abundant.
Research from the IMF supports this interpretation. In the 
1960–76 period, changes in total factor productivity—a key 
measure of the ongoing adaptability of enterprises to new 
technology and skills—rose sharply. But most of the gains were 
lost during the Iraq war, and productivity continued to slide 
through to 2000. Estimates by Farshid Mojaverhosseini of the 
International Centre for Economic Research in Italy suggest that 
nearly half of the difference in growth rates before and after the 
revolution can be attributed to lagging productivity, particularly 
in the government- and bonyad-dominated manufacturing 
sector. Khatami-era reforms did open a few opportunities for 
private enterprise, but limited access to credit, plus predatory 
competition from the bonyads, the IRGC and other protected 
entities, made success stories few and far between.
AHMADINEJAD AND THE NEW POPULISM 
Hopes that reformers would dig Iran out of its structural trap 
faded with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. 
A former member of the Basij, the civilian auxiliary of the 
Revolutionary Guard, Ahmadinejad enjoyed active support 
from both the Guards and Ayatollah Khamenei, who had 
succeeded Khomeini as supreme leader. President Ahmadinejad 
helped extend the IRGC’s control of Iran’s security apparatus, 
consolidating his own influence by showering the Guards with 
favours in the form of government loans and contracts. 
Ahmadinejad’s economic strategy might best be characterized 
as petro-populism. Taken from the playbook of Hugo Chavez of 
Venezuela, the idea was to serve as champion of the common man 
in the struggle against ill-defined exploiters—to “put the oil money 
on everyone’s dinner table” by redistribution to the masses.
11www.li.com www.prosperity.com
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Long-time Iranian observer Nader Habibi of Brandeis University notes that while 
Ahmadinejad’s economic policies seem erratic and capricious, they follow from 
simple principles. First, he believes in an active role for the government, and has little 
confidence in the ability of privatisation to improve the lot of the common citizen. 
Privatisation, in Ahmadinejad’s world, is not out of the question. But to make sense to 
him, it would have to strengthen his political coalition. 
Second, Ahmadinejad is a genuine populist in that he believes the government ought 
redistribute wealth and income to the poor. Third, he’s sceptical of the need for fiscal 
conservatism, believing that the state should spend oil revenues aggressively to 
enhance its power. Finally, he views financial institutions, particularly the state-owned 
banks, purely as instruments of government policy and has little understanding of the 
role of financial intermediaries in the efficient allocation of capital. 
But much of Ahmadinejad’s strength lies in his inclination to pragmatism in designing 
policies that push his agenda and keep him in office. These can be seen in two big 




In the 2009 election, both Ahmadinejad and his opponent, the 
centrist reformer Mir-Hossein Mousavi Khameneh, promised 
the wholesale privatisation of the gigantic public sector. 
But both had in mind transfers that would serve their own 
influential constituents—think of privatisation in Russia and 
Mexico in the 1990s. 
The major difference between the two candidates lay in the 
groups that would benefit. Mousavi, who was backed by 
Rafsanjani, intended to enrich Rafsanjani’s long-established 
network of businessmen, mullahs and their bazaari partners—
essentially a continuation of Khatami’s policy. Ahmadinejad, for 
his part, wanted the state enterprises to go to senior officers in 
Revolutionary Guard and their business partners. Under either 
candidate, the fortunate recipients could count on financing 
their acquisitions with loans on extremely favourable terms 
from state-owned banks.
Having won both reelection and the privatisation battle, Ahmadinejad 
issued a number of so-called ‘Justice Shares’, blocks of stocks 
reserved for employees of the privatised companies. While it 
is not clear how much stock has been given away in this manner, 
it is clear that high-ranking IRGC officers comprise the major 
shareholders of many of the privatised companies. Thousands 
of other active and retired IRGC personnel, along with their 
colleagues from the security agencies, also received shares. If these 
distributions continue on their current trajectory, a military-security 
elite of around 100,000 could emerge as the principal economic 
power bloc in the Islamic Republic. 
SUBSIDY REFORM
Khatami’s attempts to overhaul the country’s crazy-quilt subsidy 
programme came to naught; the Iranian government continued 
to spend the equivalent of $100 billion a year on energy and 
basic commodities to the population at large. But the onset 
of the global financial crisis made oil revenues more volatile; 
meanwhile, international sanctions on Iran began to bite. 
Ahmadinejad was therefore pressed to embark on a parliament-
approved plan under which subsidies would be phased out over 
five years. 
To make the program politically palatable—subsidy withdrawal 
in Sadat’s Egypt and, more recently, Yemen, had sparked riots—
provision was made for cash payments on a graduated scale 
to buffer the anticipated price increases. Indeed, just 20% of 
the savings was earmarked for the government treasury; the 
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rest was to be returned to households in the form of cash or used to subsidize new, 
energy-saving equipment for businesses.
The approach made solid economic sense. On the one hand, it redistributed income 
from the rich (who have enjoyed more than their share of energy subsidies) to the 
poor. On the other, it reduced distortions in markets—cheap energy meant overuse, 
and a growing diversion of oil from export to domestic use. Initially, the reforms were 
backed by key political interests and supported by the IMF. 
But the plan hit a brick wall when it became apparent that the survey data used to 
identify poor households for cash compensation was deeply flawed. Ahmadinejad 
bowed to pressure to drop means-tested compensation in favour of uniform payments 
of around $40 a month to almost every man, woman and child in Iran. This preserved 
the progressivity of the plan—the flat per capita payment covers far more of the cost 
of purchases by the poor. And it still removed the price distortions. But the budgetary 
cost of the revised compensation was even higher than that of the old subsidies.
Overly optimistic revenue projections left the government unprepared for the added 
fiscal burden. Teheran has thus been unable to provide the promised support for 
companies, truckers and other organizations facing rapidly rising energy prices. 
Moreover, since the prices that many of these energy users can charge for their own 
goods and services are controlled, some firms were caught in a price squeeze; this 
further dislocated an economy already reeling from high unemployment. And with 
more being spent on basic necessities, demand for a whole spectrum of other products 
is falling and worker lay-offs are on the rise. Adding to the economic misery, inflation 
has been accelerating, eroding the value of the monthly compensation payments. 
HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY?
By most criteria, the Ahmadinejad administration rates a failing grade for economic 
management. Its approach to privatisation has hardly been fair—the benefits are going to 
a select few. Nor has privatisation increased efficiency, since the newly privatised firms 
are no more subject to competitive pressures than they were as state-owned enterprises. 
The subsidy reforms are a mixed bag. Conceptually, it looked like the best of possible 
approaches to untangling the Gordian knot. But the government wasn’t prepared for 
the complexity of the task. And once it began to go wrong, Ahmadinejad responded by 
throwing money—money the government could ill afford—at the problem. Teheran has 
thus compounded its fiscal and monetary problems in the process of going in the right 
direction on price-distorting subsidies.
Ahmadinejad’s record on growth is similarly mixed. Between 2005 and 2010, a 
period in which export revenues (that is, oil revenues) grew at a 7% clip in real terms, 
economic growth averaged only 3.3%. Inflation remains chronic and high, with some 
estimates projecting a 20% plus rate once the full effects of the subsidy reforms work 
their way through the economy. 
By the same token, the long-run trend in investment adds no lustre to Ahmadinejad’s 
record. Gross capital formation by the public sector reached a peak of nearly one-quarter 
of GDP in the last years of the Shah, falling almost continuously thereafter to an anaemic 
www.li.com14
5% of GDP in 1989. It recovered a bit in the wake of the Iraq–Iran war, but remains 
comparatively low for a middle-income country with a high rate of savings and a 
big government sector. One reason is that much of the government budget goes to 
consumer subsidies. Another is the narrow tax base: half of the productive economy 
is tax-exempt because it is owned by government agencies or by the Islamic charities. 
The consequences are reflected in the backward state of agriculture, manufacturing 
and transportation.
Private investment has never picked up the slack. Reasons abound: a hostile 
business environment, price controls, crony capitalists unwilling to bear risk, 
uncertainty over government policy. And with Iran at loggerheads with the rest of 
the world, foreign direct investment (which has proved so important in bringing 
technology and management skills to other emerging-market economies) has 
slowed to a trickle. 
While the macroeconomic/growth trends make Ahmadinejad look bad, other policy 
areas tell a different story. Privatisation has hardly increased the efficiency of the 
Iranian economy, but it has served the Ahmadinejad’s administration’s parochial 






































































































PER CAPITA GDP: IRAN LAGS BEHIND
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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has limited growth to a rate that has left vast numbers unemployed (or working abroad), the Islamic Republic 
has succeeded on the mullah’s own terms: Poverty is down sharply since the days of the Shah, while the 
benefits of basic medical care, public health and education have been spread to most of the population. 
At the time of the revolution, Iran scored well below the average of all countries on the United Nation’s 
Human Development Index, which heavily weights health, poverty eradication and socioeconomic mobility. 
But by 1995 the country had closed the gap with Turkey, and by 2000 it exceeded the average country’s score. 
Moreover, progress didn’t end with the rise of Ahmadinejad. Today, the country is actually ranked in the UN’s 
High Human Development category—stark contrast to the Legatum Institute’s ranking in terms of prosperity. 
On the other hand, progress did stall quickly in another area of revolutionary priority: income distribution. 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani found that, after the revolution, inequality as measured by the Gini index fell from 
0.56 to 0.46, but has remained relatively constant since 1990. That latter figure implies less inequality than 
most of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, but more than other middle-income countries in the region 
including Egypt and Tunisia. 
It’s often easy—and sometimes misleading—to identify a handful of factors that determine the course of 
economic development. In the case of Iran, it doesn’t make sense to attribute the mix of tepid growth, high 






















































HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: BETTER THAN YOU’D EXPECT 
Source: United Nations Human Development Index Data Set
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with competitive market capitalism. I think the causes are quirkier—
in part, an accident of history in which the new Islamic elite became 
the enemy of growth. 
As the Islamic charities and the Revolutionary Guard gained 
power, they became increasingly effective in blocking reforms 
that would threaten their perquisites. Furthermore, since the 
political opposition to these groups was liquidated after the 
contested elections of 2009, the situation is unlikely to improve 
anytime soon. 
Iran is thus a cautionary tale for other countries in the region 
that are remaking their societies and economies in the wake 
of the Arab Spring. Every post-revolutionary economy must 
cope with high levels of uncertainty as interests jockey to fill 
the vacuum of power left by the discredited elite. While there 
are better and worse ways to reorganize an economy—history 
confirms that macroeconomic stability, the rule of law and the 
perception of social justice matter a lot—a key lesson from Iran’s 
experience is the importance of preventing those with a stake in 
inhibiting growth from coming to power.
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Population (million) (2010) 74.00 N/A
Life expectancy (years) (2010) 72.8 69.6
Birth rate (per year per 1000 people) (2010) 17 22
Fertility rate (births per female) (2010) 1.7 2.8
Life satisfaction* (rated 0 > 10) (2011) 4.8 5.5
Female representation in the legislature (2011) 2.8% 19.5%
Internet access at home? (2011) 22.0% 34.2%
Satisfied with job/work?* (% yes) (2011) 65.0% 73.3%
People are treated with respect in your country* (% yes) (2011) 83% 85.1%


















Rank/ No. of countries
Legatum Prosperity Index™ 102/142
Average Life Satisfaction Ranking* (2011) 101/142
Per Capita GDP Ranking (2009) 60/142
WEF Global Competitiveness Index (2011) 62/142
UN Human Development Index (2011) 88/187
Heritage/WSJ Economic Freedom Index (2011) 171/179
TI Corruption Perceptions Index (2011) 120/182
World Bank Doing Business Index (2012) 144/183
INDEX COMPARISONS SUB-INDEX RANKINGS
  Top 30
  Upper Middle (41)
  Lower Middle (41)
  Bottom 30
70 ECONOMY Iran Global Av.
5 year growth rate (2009) 3.2% 2.7%
Confidence in financial institutions?* (% yes) (2008) 66.9% 61.9%
Satisfaction with living standards?* (% yes) (2011) 64.9% 59%
95 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & OPPORTUNITY
Business start-up costs (% of GNI) (2011) 3.8% 36.3%
Mobile phones (per 100 ppl) (2011) 74.9 98.7
Will working hard get you ahead?* (% yes) (2011) 88.7% 81.1%
126 GOVERNANCE
Confidence in the government?* (% yes) (2008) 60.4% 53.7%
Confidence in the judiciary?* (% yes) (2008) 58.1% 52.5%
Government effectiveness 1 (2010) -0.52 0.03
57 EDUCATION
Pupil to teacher ratio (2009) 20:1 25:1
Satisfaction with education quality?* (% yes) (2011) 74.1% 66.6%
Perception children are learning?* (% yes) (2011) 84.3% 70.4%
66 HEALTH Iran Global Av.
Self-reported health problems?* (% yes) (2011) 29.1% 23.9%
Hospital beds* (per 1000 people) (2009) 1.7 3.2
Satisfaction with health?* (% yes) (2011) 83.5% 78.8%
125 SAFETY & SECURITY
Human flight 2 (2011) 6.7 5.4
Safe walking at night?* (% yes) (2008) 56.5% 61.9%
Property stolen?* (% yes) (2011) 21.5% 16.8%
125 PERSONAL FREEDOM
Civil liberties 3 (2011) 2 4.8
Tolerance for immigrants?* (% yes) (2011) 55.1% 65%
Satisfaction with freedom of choice?* (% yes) (2008) 60.1% 73.4%
121 SOCIAL CAPITAL
Rely on others?* (% yes) (2011) 58.2% 80.6%
Donations?* (% yes) (2011) 51.0% 28%
Help strangers?* (% yes) (2011) 70.2% 45.7%
PROSPERITY INDEX: DATA IN FOCUS
NOTES: 1 Gov. effectiveness: values range from -1.73 to 2.25, higher values indicate higher effectiveness. 2 Human flight: values range from 1 to 10, higher values indicate higher levels of human flight. 3 Civil liberties: values 
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